The Posse has commented many times upon the pervasive (and false) notion that the US military is in some way “broken” as a result of ongoing operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere.
The latest contribution to this ignoble (and ignorant) parade of idiocy is the Wall Street Journal’s Mark Helprin, whose rant against talk radio contains this gem:
The Democrats' advantage in 2008 is that the costs of the war in Iraq have been highly disproportionate to its effects, not least in the decline of the American military, when it could have been otherwise.
(Helprin earlier establishes his bona-fides as a fool by arguing that we should have driven into Baghdad in three days, stayed for three weeks and left behind a puppet strong man – perhaps like Musharraf, only less controllable or stable – to clean up the mess. But I digress.)
The point here is that once again we are seeing the trope that a battle-hardened military is somehow defective because its deployments are longer than usual and its equipment has more wear and tear.
We cannot address the question of how “broken” our military is unless we first establish a bench mark – something to compare it with.
The one that most observers seem to be using is that of a peace-time military. Now this is not just any peace-time military, it is an idealized one that apparently does not exist and never has.
During the 1990s, we had a peace-time military that was characterized by low morale, lack of mission focus, high turnover, equipment shortages and manpower shortfalls. Arguably, that military was more “broken” than the one we have now. Unlike that military, the one we have now has historically high retention rates, is boasting newer and more powerful weapons, and its morale is amazing. Despite waging wars in two theatres simultaneously, we still have the luxury of rotating troops home – not just for a week or a two of R&R – but for months at a time. This is without precedent.
The military in the 1980s looks better, but it was also configured for a totally different kind of fighting. We simply don’t need 60,000 troops in South Korea or an entire Army corps in the Fulda Gap.
When it came down to it, it performed well in the first Gulf War, but was denied total victory by the political leaders who left Saddam in power – a mistake we are still paying for (but one that Helprin and company no doubt still think was the right idea).
Perhaps the best comparison is between our military and the people it is fighting.
Via the hated Instapundit, I found this article to be fascinating. Of particular import is this link to the terrorist “diary” found during a raid. Take the time to read through it – it isn’t very long.
One thing that is clear is that this is an organization that is completely disintegrating. Note what is happening: battalions are deserting en masse with their commanders. Military units are going from 600 effectives to 20. Note how much time this commander is spending simply trying to find a working truck.
Now compare this with the American military as chronicled by Michael Yon or Michael Totten. Not everything is easy forthe American forces there, but the biggest complaints for many units are that the toilets are icky and they are tired of Hot Pockets for dinner.
Replacements? Adequate. Supplies? Ample. Surrenders? None. Defections? Unthinkable.
In previous wars, some American units took so many casualties that they had to be disbanded or amalgamated into a different organization. Some divisions lost more men than they started with – and yet they were still able to prevail and maintain their élan. This is not even close to happening in Iraq or Afghanistan. To put it another way, the attrition the terrorists are experiencing is simply beyond our imagination. We cannot conceive of our own units losing half of their men and still remaining anything close to operational.
Now there is a strain of thought that basically holds that the terrorists have a superhuman tolerance for casualties – that they are immune to fear, laugh in the face of death and can leap tall buildings in a single bound. Basically they are unbeatable.
Events are showing just how false this is, but it is also worth pointing out that other organizations had the same aura of invincibility. Yet the numbers do not lie. Even the vaunted SS were reduced to fielding half-trained teenagers using shoddy weaponry by the spring of 1945. The losses added up.
So it is with the jihadists. Instead of ruthless, skilled commandos they are duping mental cases into being unwilling bomb carriers. The enemy is clearly scraping the bottom of the barrel.
It is true that our equipment is wearing out – but this is a function of the age of much of it. The Air Force’s fleet is the oldest it has ever had – and long overdue for replacement.
It is also a function of heavy use – which also happens when troops actually have the money to train hard and often. The only way equipment isn’t worn out is when it is sealed in storage – and thus no one is proficient in it.
This diary more than anything else demonstrates what a broken army really looks like – no money, no men, merely growing list of enemies that they have no power to harm.
The US military may be under some strain, but this strain also gives it a potent edge – a reservoir of combat and logistical experience that it will draw upon for years to come. It would be nice if more commentators – particularly conservatives – looked at the facts and cracked open a history book once in a while before opining on the state of our military.
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